

## Message Text

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: US PAPER FOR TRILATERAL EXPERTS MEETING

1. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF US WORKING PAPER ON CEILINGS  
ISSUE FOR DISCUSSION AT TRILATERAL EXPERTS MEETING MARCH 20-  
21. ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE TO DELIVER COPIES TO FOREIGN  
OFFICES (TICKELL, RUTH) AT OPENING OF BUSINESS MONDAY,  
MARCH 17.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

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.....OPTION III--POST-TRILATERAL CEILING ISSUES

..... WORKING PAPER

#### INTRODUCTION.

IN THE US WORKING DRAFT, US VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS IN MBFR, WE DESCRIBED OUR VIEWS ON THE LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS RESULTING FROM OPTION III REDUCTIONS.

THE CEILING ISSUES SHOULD BE VIEWED AGAINST THE BACK-DROP OF:

-- THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS FOR OPTION III IS A TRADE-OFF OF REDUCTIONS OF UNITED STATES NUCLEAR ELEMENTS FOR SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET TANKS AND MANPOWER. THE CEILING ISSUES NOW AT HAND DERIVE FROM THIS EXCHANGE.

- -- POST-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO INTERFERE WITH NATO'S ABILITY TO RESTRUCTURE, IMPROVE, OR MODERNIZE ITS FORCES.

#### TRILATERAL CONSULTATIONS

- THE US-UK-FRG TRILATERAL CONSULTATIONS SHOWED THAT THE UK AND FRG WISHED CLARIFICATION OF THE US POSITION ON A NUMBER OF POINTS AND IN ADDITION RAISED SOME SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS. THEIR PRINCIPAL CONCERN WAS THAT THE US FORMULATIONS LEFT TOO MANY SITUATIONS TO NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND THEREFORE ALLOWED THE EAST AN EXCESSIVE DROIT DE REGARD OVER WESTERN FORCE DECISIONS AND CREATED EXCESSIVE RISKS OF ESTABLISHING BROAD PRECEDENTS FOR PHASE II.

- ON THE OTHER HAND, THE US, IN ARRIVING AT THE FORMULATIONS IN US VIEWS, WISHED TO RETAIN FLEXIBILITY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION AND AVOID VISIBLY CODIFYING DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE AREA. NEVERTHELESS, WE UNDERSTAND THE UK AND FRG CONCERNS. IN WHAT FOLLOWS, WE SEEK BOTH TO CLARIFY THE PREVIOUS US FORMULATIONS ON ISSUES RAISED IN THE TRILATERALS AND DISCUSS ILLUSTRATIVE ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS, BASED ON GREATER SPECIFICITY. WE WANT TO STRESS THAT THIS IS A WORKING DRAFT, WHICH DESCRIBES THE CONCERNS THAT LED US TO THE FORMULATIONS IN THE US VIEWS PAPER AND WHICH EXPLAINS SOME POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES ON A VERY TENTATIVE BASIS. IN PARTICULAR, WE ARE NOT COMMITTED TO ANY OF THESE ALTERNATIVES, MANY OF WHICH HAVE SERIOUS DISADVANTAGES.

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TIONS, BASED ON GREATER SPECIFICITY. WE WANT TO STRESS THAT THIS IS A WORKING DRAFT, WHICH DESCRIBES THE CONCERNS THAT LED US TO THE FORMULATIONS IN THE US VIEWS PAPER AND WHICH EXPLAINS SOME POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES ON A VERY TENTATIVE BASIS. IN PARTICULAR, WE ARE NOT COMMITTED TO ANY OF THESE ALTERNATIVES, MANY OF WHICH HAVE SERIOUS DISADVANTAGES.

- IN EXAMINING THE RECORDS OF OUR EARLIER TRILATERALS AND THE PAPERS SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSMITTED BY THE UK AND FRG IN REVIEWING EARLIER US WORK ON CEILINGS, WE HAVE IDENTIFIED SEVERAL BASIC ISSUES:

-- ANGLO-GERMAN INTEREST IN SOMEHOW COVERING ANALOGOUS SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN THE NGA;

- -- SERIOUS ANGLO-GERMAN RESERVATIONS ABOUT ACCEPTING EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS ON EUROPEAN FORCES IN PHASE I.

- -- GREATER SPECIFICITY OF OBLIGATIONS PLUS REQUIRING RECIPROCITY LEADS TO VISIBLE CODIFICATION OF DISPARITIES.

THE ALTERNATIVES, AS COMPARED WITH THE PREVIOUS US PAPER, MORE CLEARLY STATE AND DELIMIT THE EFFECTS OF THE CEILINGS, REDUCE THE RELIANCE ON GENERALIZED NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS, AND LEAVE FEWER AND NARROWER ISSUES FOR LATER AGREEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE MORE SPECIFIC ALTERNATIVES, TEND TO CODIFY IN A VISIBLE WAY UNFAVORABLE NUMERICAL DISPARITIES IN OVERALL TANK STOCKS AND NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRECEDENT THESE MIGHT SET FOR PHASE II.

#### DEFINITION OF REDUCED ELEMENTS

- THE PREVIOUS US PAPER DID NOT PROVIDE FOR AN EXPLICIT DEFINITION OF "NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT." INSTEAD IT RELIED ON A NARROWER DEFINITION BASED ON US WITHDRAWALS, IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE RESTRICTIONS ON FOLLOW-ON EQUIPMENT AND IN ORDER TO AVOID NEGOTIATING DIFFICULTIES THAT MIGHT LEAD TO COVERAGE OF ALL AIRCRAFT. THE US HAS IN THE PAST DEFINED ITS OWN AIRCRAFT IN TERMS  
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OF NUCLEAR WIRING, AND CONSIDERED SOVIET AIRCRAFT IN LIGHT OF APPARENT UNIT MISSIONS.

- WE COULD INSTEAD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE, WHICH PROVIDES A MORE SPECIFIC BASIS FOR APPLYING CATEGORY I, II, AND III LIMITS, AS WELL AS A BASIS IN PRINCIPLE FOR EXTENSION OF THE LIMITS TO FOLLOW-ON AIRCRAFT TYPES (AS WELL AS TO EXISTING AIRCRAFT TYPES NOT CURRENTLY IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS).

- UNDER THIS ALTERNATIVE, "NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT" WOULD BE DEFINED TO BE ALL AIRCRAFT OF A SPECIFIC TYPE (I.E., F-4S, INCLUDING RF-4S; FITTERS; FISHBEDS; F-104S INCLUDING RF-104S; ETC.) IN THE AREA, IF AT LEAST SOME AIRCRAFT OF THAT TYPE BASED IN THE AREA(1) ARE

PHYSICALLY CAPABLE OF DELIVERING A NUCLEAR WEAPON WITHOUT FURTHER MODIFICATION. WE WOULD PRESUME, INTER ALIA, THAT ANY TYPE OF TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN SQUADRONS WITH NUCLEAR OPERATIONAL MODES WOULD BE NUCLEAR-CAPABLE UNDER THIS DEFINITION.

(1) "BASED IN THE AREA" IS USED IN ORDER TO ALLOW, FOR EXAMPLE, THE INTRODUCTION OF US AIR FORCE A-7DS INTO THE AREA AS A NON-NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, EVEN THOUGH US NAVY A-7ES ARE IN FACT NUCLEAR-CAPABLE. THIS PHRASEOLOGY WOULD ALSO PROTECT FUTURE FLEXIBILITY TO RETROFIT SOME MODELS OF THE F-15 OR F-16 WITH A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OUTSIDE THE NGA. THE PROBLEM IS THAT ALLOWING THIS FLEXIBILITY COULD UNDERMINE THE BARGAINING VALUE OF OPTION III AND INTRODUCES SERIOUS VERIFICATION PROBLEMS.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH WOULD BE ONE WHICH DEFINES NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT BY MODEL (E.G., FISHBED J/K/L) RATHER THAN BY TYPE (E.G., FISHBED). THIS NARROWS THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONSTRAINT, MORE CLOSELY APPROXIMATES A DEFINITION BASED ON NUCLEAR TASKING, AND WOULD ALLOW NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR CAPABLE MODELS OF A GIVEN TYPE TO BE DISTINGUISHED. WE COULD ALSO MODIFY OUR DEFINITION OF SSM ELEMENTS FROM "US PERSHING SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS" TO "LAUNCHERS FOR US SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH RANGES GREATER THAN 500 KMS."

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HOWEVER, WE WOULD NOT WANT TO BE ANY MORE SPECIFIC WITH OUR NUCLEAR WARHEAD DEFINITION, SO AS TO AVOID ANY CONSTRAINT ON SPECIFIC WARHEAD TYPES.

- WE COULD MOVE TO MAKE THESE DEFINITIONS EVEN MORE SPECIFIC BY DEVELOPING LISTS OF THE VARIOUS TYPES (OR MODELS) OF SYSTEMS COVERED. USING AIRCRAFT AS AN EXAMPLE, FOR CATEGORY I LIMITATIONS, NATO WOULD TABLE A LIST OF THE TYPES OF US AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA THAT NATO CONSIDERS TO BE NUCLEAR CAPABLE. FOR CATEGORY II, WE COULD TABLE A COMPARABLE LIST FOR SOVIET AIRCRAFT. FOR CATEGORY III, THERE COULD BE A LIST FOR NATO AND WARSAW PACT AIRCRAFT. IN ALL CASES, THE LIST WOULD CONTAIN ONLY AIRCRAFT TYPES, NOT OUR ESTIMATES OF NUMBERS OF EACH TYPE IN THE AREA. IN EACH CATEGORY, THE WARSAW PACT COULD TABLE ITS OWN LIST, OR ACCEPT OR NEGOTIATE THE NATO LIST. AFTER DISCUSSION, THE PARTIES WOULD AGREE ON A LIST FOR EACH CATEGORY OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT TYPES. AIRCRAFT TYPES COULD LATER BE ADDED TO THE LIST BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT, ONCE THEY ENTER THE NGA. FOR EXAMPLE, THE US COULD INTRODUCE A NEW AIRCRAFT TYPE "Y." IF THE EAST BELIEVED IT WAS NUCLEAR-CAPABLE,

A DISCUSSION WOULD ENSUE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE AIRCRAFT WAS NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AND SHOULD BE PLACED ON THE US LIST.

- REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE LIST OR ON SUBSEQUENT ADDITIONS TO THE LIST, IS NOT LIKELY TO BE EASY. EASTERN AND WESTERN INTERESTS AS TO BREADTH OF COVERAGE MAY CONFLICT. EACH SIDE WILL WISH TO MAINTAIN MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY FOR ITSELF AND MAXIMUM CONSTRAINTS FOR THE OTHER. HOWEVER, THIS APPROACH MIGHT ALSO LESSEN THE RANGE OF DISPUTES ABOUT REPLACEMENT AND FOLLOW-ON SYSTEMS, SINCE THE LIST WOULD CONSTITUTE A GROWING BODY OF PRECEDENTS. NEGOTIATING AN AGREED LIST WOULD NOT REQUIRE AGREEMENT ON A STANDARD METHOD FOR DETERMINING WHETHER AN AIRCRAFT IS NUCLEAR-CAPABLE OR NOT. ONCE THE LIST WAS AGREED, IT COULD BE VERIFIED BY NTM, WHEREAS RELYING ON DEFINITIONS WITH NO AGREEMENT ON A LIST, WOULD INVOLVE

MORE UNCERTAINTY AND COULD REQUIRE INTRUSIVE, AND POSSIBLY  
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UNACCEPTABLE, INSPECTION.

SIMILAR LISTS COULD BE AGREED FOR MISSILE LAUNCHERS AND FOR MAIN BATTLE TANKS. BUT FOR WARHEADS, WE DO NOT WANT TO ADOPT THE LIST APPROACH. RATHER, WE WANT TO AVOID ANY CONSTRAINT ON THE MIX OF WARHEADS AND ANY ASSOCIATION OF WARHEADS WITH DELIVERY MEANS. THUS, TO MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY, THE TYPES OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS TO BE WITHDRAWN UNDER OPTION III WOULD BE UNSPECIFIED AS WOULD TYPES IN THE RESIDUAL LEVEL.

- TABLE I LISTS US, NATO, SOVIET, AND PACT NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT BY TYPE AND NUMBER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

- TABLE II LISTS US, NATO, SOVIET, AND PACT SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES BY TYPE, RANGE, AND NUMBER IN THE AREA.

TABLE III LISTS US, NATO, SOVIET, AND PACT MAIN BATTLE TANKS BY TYPE AND NUMBER IN THE NGA.

THE TABLES ARE INTENDED FOR ALLIED DISCUSSION;  
ANY LISTS PROVIDED TO THE EAST UNDER THIS APPROACH WOULD NOT CONTAIN NUMBERS.

CATEGORY I - LIMITATION ON RESIDUAL LEVELS OF US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AND SOVIET TANKS

- THE US VIEWS PAPER OUTLINED NARROWLY DRAWN CONSTRAINTS

ON REDUCED ELEMENTS, LIMITING THEM TO RESIDUAL NUMERICAL LEVELS. AIRCRAFT AND SSM LAUNCHERS WERE DESCRIBED IN TERMS OF THE SPECIFIC TYPE WITHDRAWN (NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT AND PERSHING SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS). THE LIMITATIONS WERE ALSO APPLIED TO EXISTING SYSTEMS OF SIMILAR OR GREATER CAPABILITY, BUT NO SPECIFIC LIMITS WERE APPLIED TO FOLLOW-ON SYSTEMS. THESE WERE TO BE COVERED BY GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION LANGUAGE. THIS APPROACH MAXIMIZED US FLEXIBILITY, AT THE COST OF ACCEPTING SIMILAR FLEXIBILITY FOR SOVIET TANKS. WARHEADS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WERE BROADLY DEFINED, WITH COMPLETE FREEDOM TO MIX, (BUT FOLLOW-ON SECRET

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WARHEADS WERE ASSUMED SUBJECT TO THE OVERALL NUMERICAL LIMIT.)

THE FOLLOWING IS AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO CATEGORY I WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED IN ORDER TO MEET UK AND FRG CONCERNS ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR SOVIET CIRCUMVENTION OR LATER DISPUTES ABOUT THESE LIMITS.

THE LIMITS RESULTING FROM THE US WARHEAD REDUCTION WOULD APPLY TO THE AGGREGATE LEVEL OF US NUCLEAR WARHEAD IN THE AREA.

THE LIMITS RESULTING FROM THE US PERSHING WITHDRAWALS WOULD APPLY TO LAUNCHERS FOR US SSMS IN THE AREA WITH RANGES IN EXCESS OF 500 KMS. PERSHING IS THE ONLY US SSM AFFECTED UNDER THIS APPROACH.

- THE REASON WE WOULD CHOOSE THE 500 KM DISTANCE IN OUR ALTERNATIVE, AS OPPOSED TO INCLUSION OF ALL SSMS, IS TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY FOR THE US (AND THE ALLIES) TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF SSMS WITH A LESS THAN 500 KM RANGE; TO USE A FORMULA TAILORED TO A CATEGORY II CONSTRAINT THAT WOULD PREVENT INTRODUCTION OF SCALEBOARD (GIVING THE WEST A CLEAR SUPERIORITY IN LONG-RANGE SSMS); AND TO AVOID RAISING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE INCLUSION OF NIKE-HERCULES SYSTEMS. FURTHER, THIS RETAINS OUR FLEXIBILITY FOR QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS OF SSMS WHICH ARE LIMITED.

THE LIMITS RESULTING FROM THE US F-4 WITHDRAWAL WOULD APPLY TO US NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT IN THE NGA (AS DISCUSSED ABOVE). US NON-NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT BE LIMITED. THE LIMITS RESULTING FROM SOVIET TANK WITHDRAWALS WOULD APPLY TO SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN THE NGA.

IN EACH CASE, AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED ON A LIST OF EQUIPMENT TYPES THAT WOULD FALL UNDER THE LIMITATIONS. NEW TYPES WOULD BE ADDED TO THE LIST BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT ONCE THEY APPEARED IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THEY WOULD THEN BE SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATION AT RESIDUAL NUMERICAL

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LEVELS ON REDUCED ELEMENTS. WE WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE CONSTRAINED ELEMENTS WERE RESTRICTED ONLY NUMERICALLY AND COULD BE QUALITATIVELY IMPROVED OR REPLACED ON A ONE FOR ONE BASIS.

COMMENT. THIS DEVELOPMENT OF THE US CATEGORY I LIMITATIONS SUBSTITUTES LIMITS BASED ON GENERAL DEFINITIONS FOR SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT MODELS, (E.G., NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT INSTEAD OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F-4S; MISSILES WITH RANGES IN EXCESS OF 500 KMS, RATHER THAN PERSHING'S.) IT THEREFORE, IS CLEARER ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT THE LIMITS APPLY TO OTHER US EQUIPMENT. IN PARTICULAR, THIS FORMULATION WOULD:

- -- MAKE IT CLEAR THAT LANCE IS UNCONSTRAINED, UNLESS LANCE RANGE IS INCREASED TO MORE THAN 500 KMS.

- -- LIMIT THE AREA OF AMBIGUITY IN FOLLOW-ON EQUIPMENT ISSUES BY ESTABLISHING A BODY OF PRECEDENTS AS TO WHAT IS AND IS NOT LIMITED.

- -- MAKE CLEAR WHAT EQUIPMENT IS COVERED IN CATEGORY II AND III LIMITATIONS.

THIS FORMULATION MIGHT CONCEIVABLY LIMIT OUR FLEXIBILITY IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, BECAUSE IT PROVIDES THAT FOLLOW-ON SYSTEMS OF THE GENERIC TYPE REDUCED WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE RESIDUAL LIMIT. THAT IS, NEW TYPES OF US NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, LAUNCHERS FOR US SSMS WITH A RANGE GREATER THAN 500 KMS, OR SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS COULD ONLY BE INTRODUCED AS ONE-FOR-ONE REPLACEMENTS OF EXISTING SYSTEMS.

CATEGORY II - RECIPROCITY - LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS REDUCED BY THE OTHER PARTY (US TANKS AND SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS)

THE US VIEWS PAPER PUT FORWARD A PROPOSAL FOR SOME CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN THE NGA, RECOGNIZING THE SOVIETS WOULD ALSO DEMAND RESTRICTIONS ON US TANKS. THE PAPER SUGGESTED, AS AN EXAMPLE, A

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GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION WHICH COULD INCLUDE OR BE ACCOMPANIED BY A UNILATERAL STATEMENT THAT "SIGNIFICANT INCREASES" OF SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS OF THE TYPES WITHDRAWN BY THE US WOULD CONSTITUTE CIRCUMVENTION OF THE AGREEMENT. WE WOULD IN TURN EXPECT A SIMILAR SOVIET STATEMENT ABOUT US TANK INCREASES. THIS, IT WAS ARGUED, WOULD GIVE THE US SOME FLEXIBILITY IN TANK LEVELS, AND WOULD NOT CONSTRAIN SOVIET NUCLEAR CAPABILITY SO TIGHTLY AS TO WEAKEN THE VALUE OF OPTION III.

THE UK AND FRG PUT GREATER EMPHASIS THAN DID THE US PAPER ON THE NEED FOR PUTTING MORE EXPLICIT LIMITS ON A SOVIET NUCLEAR BUILDUP, AND FOR IDENTIFYING WHICH PARTICULAR SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WERE COVERED. MOREOVER, THEY DISAGREED WITH THE FORM OF A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION SUPPLEMENTED BY A UNILATERAL US STATEMENT, BELIEVING IT IMPORTANT TO OBTAIN A CLEAR SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THESE LIMITS.

- AN ALTERNATIVE, INCORPORATING THE UK AND FRG POINTS, MIGHT BE AS FOLLOWS:

THE US AND USSR WOULD AGREE THAT, IN ORDER TO AVOID CIRCUMVENTION OF THE REDUCTION MEASURES AND TO

AVOID UNDERMINING THE BASIS OF THE TANK-NUCLEAR TRADE, FORCE ELEMENTS ANALOGOUS TO THOSE REDUCED BY THE OTHER PARTY COULD NOT BE INCREASED ABOVE THE NUMERICAL LEVEL EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE AGREEMENT BY MORE THAN A SPECIFIC AMOUNT OR PERCENTAGE WHICH WOULD BE AGREED TO IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. AS WITH THE CATEGORY I LIMITATIONS, THE TWO PARTIES WOULD NEGOTIATE LISTS OF THE EQUIPMENT ITEMS CURRENTLY IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA (EXCEPT WARHEADS) THAT WOULD BE COVERED BY THE LIMITATION, (E.G., SOVIET NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT TYPES, SOVIET SSMS WITH RANGES GREATER THAN 500 KMS, AND US MAIN BATTLE TANKS). AGAIN, ANALOGOUS EQUIPMENT TYPES WOULD BE ADDED TO THE LIST BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT, ONCE THEY APPEARED IN THE NGA, AND WOULD BECOME SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATION.

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THIS ALTERNATIVE REFORMULATION OF CATEGORY II LIMITATIONS SOMEWHAT INCREASES THE CLARITY OF THE RECIPROCAL LIMITATIONS ON THE US AND USSR. IN PARTICULAR,



IT PROVIDES THAT CATEGORY II LIMITATIONS WOULD BE SPECIFIED BY COMMON UNDERSTANDING MORE PRECISELY THAN IN A GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION. HOWEVER, THE AGREEMENTS (TO THE PRINCIPLE, TO THE SIZE OF THE PERMISSIBLE INCREASE, AND THE EQUIPMENT LISTS) WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE IN THE BASIC PHASE I AGREEMENT, BUT COULD BE IN SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOLS, AGREED INTERPRETATIONS, ETC., ON THE SALT MODEL.

THIS APPROACH WOULD POSE NO GREAT PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. WE WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT SOVIET NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN THE NGA WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATION, BUT WE WOULD NOT SEEK ANY LISTING OF SPECIFIC WARHEAD TYPES (TO BE CONSISTENT WITH OUR APPROACH TO OUR OWN WARHEAD LIMITATION.) AS TO THE LISTING OF SOVIET SSMS, THE ONLY TACTICAL SOVIET SSM WITH A RANGE GREATER THAN 500 KMS IS THE SCALEBOARD, (EXCEPT FOR THE SHADDOCK, AN AIR-BREATHING CRUISE MISSILE.) NEITHER IS YET BELIEVED TO BE IN THE NGA. THUS, SCALEBOARD OR EQUIVALENT FUTURE SSMS COULD NOT BE INTRODUCED INTO THE AREA, ALTHOUGH FROGS AND SCUDS COULD BE UNCONSTRAINED, SHORT OF AN INCREASE IN THEIR RANGE TO EXCEED 500 KMS.

WITH REGARD TO AIRCRAFT, THE NUCLEAR CAPABLE SOVIET AIRCRAFT COVERED UNDER OUR PROPOSED FORMULATION WOULD INCLUDE ABOUT 75 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL SOVIET COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN THE NGA. SINCE CATEGORIZATION WOULD BE BY TYPE OF AIRCRAFT ONLY (THAT IS, FOR EXAMPLE, SINCE WE WOULD NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN FISHBED D'S AND K'S) THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO CHANGE CERTAIN AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA

WHICH PRESENTLY ARE DEPLOYED ONLY IN A CONVENTIONAL ROLE (LIKE FISHBED D'S) TO NUCLEAR TASKED AIRCRAFT. THIS COULD OCCUR EITHER BY SIMPLY CHANGING THE MISSION AND TRAINING OF CURRENT UNITS, OR BY A ONE-FOR-ONE REPLACEMENT OF THESE UNITS WITH NEWER AIRCRAFT HAVING A NUCLEAR MISSION. THIS WOULD PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO CONVERT SOME 300 OF THE 1,090

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AIRCRAFT COVERED BY THE LIMITATION FROM WHAT IS AT PRESENT PROBABLY ONLY A CONVENTIONAL ROLE TO A CLEARLY NUCLEAR ONE.

- THIS COULD BE PRECLUDED BY A DEFINITION OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT THAT DISTINGUISHES AMONG MODELS, NOT JUST TYPES, AND WHICH WOULD THUS ENCOMPASS A SMALLER PERCENTAGE OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT IN THE NGA -- NAMELY, THOSE WHICH CURRENTLY HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED IN UNITS WITH NUCLEAR MISSIONS. HOWEVER, SINCE 1960 VIRTUALLY ALL THE AIRCRAFT MODELS (AND ALL THE AIRCRAFT TYPES) THE USSR HAS ADDED TO ITS TACTICAL

INVENTORY WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED TO BE NUCLEAR CAPABLE. THUS THERE WOULD BE NO MODERN REPLACEMENTS FOR THE NON-NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT IN THE NGA NOT COVERED BY THE LIMITATION. UNLESS A NEW, TRULY NON-NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT WERE DEVELOPED, THE EXISTING NON-NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT COULD NOT BE REPLACED, AND THE SIZE OF THE TOTAL SOVIET AIR FORCE IN THE NGA WOULD SHRINK AS THESE AIRCRAFT WERE RETIRED FROM INVENTORY. ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE SUCH A SEVERE CONSTRAINT ON THE SOVIETS WOULD UNDERCUT THE BARGAINING VALUE OF OPTION III.

THE MORE SPECIFIC APPROACH DISCUSSED HERE COULD POSE SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEMS FOR US TANK INVENTORIES. WHILE WE HAVE NO PLANS TO INCREASE TOTAL AUTHORIZED TANK STOCKS, WE WOULD WANT TO BE ABLE TO RESTORE OUR TANK STOCKS TO AUTHORIZED LEVELS. THIS COULD REQUIRE AN INCREASE IN OUR ACTUAL TANK LEVEL OF OVER 30 PERCENT, DEPENDING ON THE DATE AN AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO FORCE. TO PERMIT THIS INCREASE, WE MIGHT SEEK AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE SOVIETS THAT WOULD SET THE LIMITATION ON US TASKS AT LEVELS ACTUALLY ACHIEVED IN THE PAST. WITHOUT SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING, ANY SIGNIFICANT REMAINING DEFICIENCY IN INVENTORIES AT THE TIME AN AGREEMENT WENT INTO EFFECT WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMMODATED WITHIN WHAT WAS AGREED BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS A PERMISSIBLE INCREASE IN RESIDUAL LEVELS ON CATEGORY II ELEMENTS.

COMMENT: EVEN IF STRUCTURED SO AS NOT TO IMPOSE SEVERE CONSTRAINTS ON NORMAL SOVIET MODERNIZATION, THE CATEGORY II APPROACH DESCRIBED ABOVE MIGHT STILL BE DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE AND MIGHT WEAKEN THE BARGAINING VALUE OF OPTION III.

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- BUT THERE IS A MORE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM WITH THIS APPROACH. AS WE NOTED IN THE US VIEWS PAPER, WHILE A LIMITATION ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN THE NGA COULD DENY THE SOVIETS CERTAIN FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS FOR SHORT RANGE SYSTEMS, SUCH A CONSTRAINT WOULD NOT HAVE GREAT MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES MOST THREATENING TO WESTERN EUROPE ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE THE NGA. IN EXCHANGE FOR THIS LIMITED BENEFIT, WE WOULD ACCEPT A LIMITATION ON US TANK LEVELS -- SOMETHING OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY VALUE TO THE SOVIETS, EVEN ASSUMING WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO NEGOTIATE A SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT PERMITTING RESTORATION OF OUR TANK STOCKS TO AUTHORIZED LEVELS.

THUS, AN ATTEMPT TO SEEK SPECIFIC RECIPROCAL LIMITS COULD CREATE PROBLEMS. ON THE OTHER HAND, UNCONSTRAINED GROWTH IN SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS COULD ERODE THE BASIS ON

WHICH OPTION III WAS PUT FORWARD. PARLIAMENTS AND PUBLICS WOULD REASONABLY REQUIRE THAT SUCH UNCONSTRAINED GROWTH NOT BE ALLOWABLE UNDER AN MBFR AGREEMENT. THE APPROACH OF THE US VIEWS PAPER, RELYING ON GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION SUPPORTED BY UNILATERAL US STATEMENTS, WAS PUT FORWARD AS AN ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THIS DILEMMA.

CATEGORY III--LIMITATIONS ON ALLIED AND NSWP NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND TANKS

- THE US VIEWS PAPER NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY ASK FOR ASSURANCE THAT INCREASES IN ALLIED FORCE LEVELS WOULD NOT OFFSET US OPTION III REDUCTIONS. THE PAPER ARGUED THAT PERMANENT EQUIPMENT LIMITS COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED, BUT THAT THE ALLIES MIGHT CONSIDER A GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION CONSTRAINT, PREVENTING SIGNIFICANT ALLIED INCREASES. WHILE THE APPLICABILITY OF SUCH A CONSTRAINT WAS NOT SPECIFIED IN THE PAPER, IT WAS INTENDED THAT IT APPLY ONLY TO SYSTEMS ANALOGOUS TO THOSE REDUCED BY THE US AND USSR. SPECIFIC DEFINITIONS OF THOSE SYSTEMS WERE NOT PROPOSED IN ORDER TO PERMIT FUTURE ALLIED FORCE IMPROVEMENTS.

- THE UK AND FRG SHOWED CONSIDERABLE CONCERN ABOUT THE SECRET

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APPROACH. IN PARTICULAR, THEY FEARED THAT GENERALLY WORDED PROVISIONS COULD LATER BE USED BY THE SOVIETS TO CLAIM A RIGHT TO INTERFERE IN A WIDE RANGE OF ALLIED FORCE DECISIONS. (THE US DOES NOT BELIEVE NATO WOULD ACCEDE TO ANY SUCH CLAIM.) THEY FAVORED A CLEARER DELINEATION OF THE TYPES OF SYSTEMS AFFECTED AND THE LEVEL OF INCREASE PERMITTED.

SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES CAN BE DESCRIBED.

THE BROADEST APPROACH WOULD REQUIRE THAT THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND THE EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS EACH COMMIT THEMSELVES NOT TO INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY THEIR RESPECTIVE POST-PHASE I AGGREGATE LEVELS OF EACH OF THE FORCE ELEMENTS REDUCED BY THEIR SIDE IN PHASE I (CATEGORY IIIA, I.E., MAIN BATTLE TANKS FOR THE EAST; NUCLEAR WARHEADS, LAUNCHERS FOR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH RANGES IN EXCESS OF 500 KMS, AND NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT FOR THE WEST). IN ADDITION, OR AS A LATER STEP, EACH SIDE COULD ACCEPT SIMILAR RESTRICTIONS ON ELEMENTS REDUCED BY THE OTHER SIDE (CATEGORY IIIB, I.E., MAIN BATTLE TANKS BY THE WEST; WARHEADS, SSM LAUNCHERS, AND NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT BY THE EAST). THE PARTIES WOULD REACH AGREEMENT ON WHAT PARTICULAR PERCENTAGE OR AMOUNT OF INCREASE WAS

"SIGNIFICANT" IN EACH SIDE'S AGGREGATE HOLDINGS OF EACH OF THESE FORCE ELEMENTS. AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED ON LISTS OF EASTERN AND WESTERN EQUIPMENT TYPES CURRENTLY IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS INCLUDING LAUNCHERS FOR SSMS WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS OF 500 KMS, NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS. ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT TYPES WOULD BE ADDED BY AGREEMENT ONCE THEY ENTERED THE NGA.

THIS APPROACH MAKES THE RESTRICTIONS ON RECIPROCAL ELEMENTS (CATEGORY IIIB ELEMENTS: WESTERN TANKS AND EASTERN NUCLEAR ELEMENTS) AS STRINGENT AS THOSE ON THE ELEMENTS AND ANALOGOUS TO THOSE REDUCED BY A GIVEN SIDE (CATEGORY IIIA ELEMENTS: WESTERN NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AND EASTERN TANKS). HOWEVER, THESE GROUPS OF ELEMENTS HAVE A SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT STATUS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. LIMITATIONS ON CATEGORY IIIA ELEMENTS ARE CLOSELY RELATED TO NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE PHASE I REDUCTIONS. INCREASES IN THESE ELEMENTS WOULD

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DIRECTLY SUBSTITUTE FOR REDUCED US AND SOVIET EQUIPMENT. THEREFORE, IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT CATEGORY IIIA ELEMENTS SHOULD LOGICALLY BE MORE STRINGENTLY CONTROLLED.

-. HENCE, THE FOLLOWING APPROACH:

- THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND THE EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD EACH COMMIT THEMSELVES NOT TO INCREASE THEIR RESPECTIVE POST-PHASE I AGGREGATE LEVELS, SO AS TO NULLIFY PHASE I REDUCTIONS OF THOSE FORCE ELEMENTS REDUCED ON THEIR SIDE. THUS, THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD LIMIT THEIR NGA LEVELS OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS, LAUNCHERS FOR SSMS WITH MORE THAN 500 KMS RANGE, AND NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, AND THE PACT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD LIMIT THEIR LEVELS OF MAIN BATTLE TANKS. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH A COMMITMENT, APPLYING COLLECTIVELY, WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH CURRENT FORCE PLANS OF THE NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

ON THE OTHER HAND, OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED WITH RESPECT TO CATEGORY IIIB ELEMENTS (WESTERN TANKS AND EASTERN NUCLEAR ELEMENTS), WHICH ARE ANALOGOUS TO THE RECIPROCAL LIMITS CONSIDERED IN CATEGORY II, COULD BE LOOSER. A COMMITMENT WOULD ONLY BE UNDERTAKEN NOT TO INCREASE THEM "SIGNIFICANTLY" WHERE "SIGNIFICANT" MEANT TO A LEVEL THAT WOULD UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF THE PHASE I AGREEMENT. THIS LEVEL COULD BE FIXED BY THE PARTIES AT SOME AGREED PERCENTAGE OR AMOUNT, OR NOT BE EXPLICITLY DEFINED.

- IN BOTH OF THE FOREGOING APPROACHES, SOME LIMITATION WAS SOUGHT ON BOTH CATEGORY IIIA AND IIIB ELEMENTS. THIS

HAS THE EFFECT OF VISIBLY CODIFYING EQUIPMENT DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THE PACT/NATO TANK RATIO WOULD BE HELD AT LEAST TEMPORARILY AT ABOUT 2:1, AS WOULD THE RATIO OF PACT/NATO NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. (SSM AND WARHEAD RATIOS WOULD BE FAVORABLE TO NATO.) FURTHER, CATEGORY IIIB LIMITATIONS (EASTERN NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AND WESTERN TANKS) ARE GENERALLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE WEST FOR THE SAME REASONS THAT CATEGORY II LIMITATIONS WERE SUSPECT-- THE WEST GAINS LITTLE MILITARILY FROM RESTRAINTS ON EASTERN NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, AND GIVES UP MUCH WHEN IT ACCEPTS  
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CONSTRAINTS ON ITS TANKS.  
FOR THIS REASON, YET ANOTHER APPROACH TO CATEGORY III LIMITATIONS MUST BE CONSIDERED. THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND THE EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD EACH COMMIT THEMSELVES NOT TO INCREASE THEIR RESPECTIVE POST-PHASE I AGGREGATE LEVELS, SO AS TO NULLIFY PHASE I REDUCTIONS OF THOSE FORCE ELEMENTS REDUCED ON THEIR SIDE. THUS, THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD LIMIT THEIR LEVELS IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS, LAUNCHERS FOR SSMS WITH MORE THAN 500 KMS RANGE, AND NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, AND THE PACT DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD LIMIT THEIR LEVELS OF MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THERE WOULD BE NO EXPLICIT LIMITATIONS ON THE LEVELS OF WESTERN TANKS OR PACT NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, THOUGH A GENERAL NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION WOULD APPLY TO SHARP INCREASES IN THESE ELEMENTS.

- IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THERE ARE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE FOREGOING APPROACHES.

COMMENT: CATEGORY III LIMITATIONS WOULD NOT BE PUT FORWARD INITIALLY, BUT ONLY IN RESPONSE TO EASTERN PRESSURE AND IN CONNECTION WITH ACHIEVING AGREEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING IN PHASE I.

IN OUR EARLIER TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WE HAD TALKED OF EQUATING "SIGNIFICANT INCREASES" TO A SINGLE PERCENTAGE FIGURE THAT WOULD APPLY TO ALL REDUCED SYSTEMS. IT IS

CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT A SINGLE FIGURE CANNOT BE APPLIED TO ALL THE SYSTEMS IN QUESTION. FOR EXAMPLE, AN INCREASE OF LESS THAN 6 PERCENT OF NATO NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT WOULD NULLIFY THE WITHDRAWAL OF 54 F-4S. AN INCREASE OF ONLY 10 PERCENT OF WP TANKS COULD NULLIFY THE SOVIET TANK REDUCTION. BUT IT WOULD REQUIRE AN INCREASE OF 25 PERCENT OF POST-PHASE I NATO SSMS TO NULLIFY THE US PERSHING WITHDRAWAL. ANY SINGLE PERCENTAGE WILL FOR SOME ELEMENTS BE SO HIGH AS TO ALLOW THE NULLIFICATION OF THE PHASE I REDUCTION, AND FOR OTHER ELEMENTS BE SO LOW AS TO BE

UNDULY RESTRICTIVE. FOR THIS REASON, OUR ALTERNATIVE  
CEILINGS FORMULATIONS HAVE REFERRED TO PERCENTAGES OR  
AMOUNTS FOR EACH OF THE EQUIPMENT ELEMENTS IN QUESTION.

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SINCE ALL OTHER PHASE I OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO ALLIED  
FORCES ARE TIME-LIMITED, CATEGORY III COMMITMENTS LIKEWISE  
SHOULD BE TIME-LIMITED, LASTING NO LONGER THAN A PERIOD OF  
5 YEARS OR UNTIL A PHASE II AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED.  
HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT ALL PHASE I PROVISIONS  
MAY BE TIME-LIMITED IN A BROADER SENSE, IN THAT A PHASE I  
AGREEMENT MAY NOT BE VIABLE IN THE LONG-RUN IF A PHASE II  
AGREEMENT IS NOT REACHED. PROVISIONS FOR FUTURE REVIEW  
AND FOR WITHDRAWAL REFLECT THIS BASIC FACTOR.

.....TABLE I

.....NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT IN THE NGA

..US(A).....SOVIET.....NATO.....WP

211 F-4....610 FISHBED.....251 US.....1090 SOVIET

40 RF-4...248 FITTER.....449 F-104.....25 BEAGLE

.....78 FLOGGER.....36 RF-104.....975 FISHBED

.....35 BEAGLE.....100 F-4.....113 FITTER

.....- .RECCE

16 FOXBAT.....60 RF-4.....113 TRAINER

103 TRAINER.....24 BUCCANEER.....23 BEAGLE

.....- .VARIANTS OF.....RECCE

.....FISHBED,

.....FITTER

TOTAL:.....TOTAL: 1090.....TOTALS:.....TOTALS:

251(B).....669 NON-US.....1249 NONSOVIET

.....920 ALL.....2339 ALL

ICOD: END 74

(A) UE AND OE

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(B) INCLUDING 23 AUTHORIZED OE AIRCRAFT

.....TABLE II

ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SSM MISSILE LAUNCHERS  
WITH RANGES EXCEEDING 500 KMS IN THE NGA.

.....NATO.....WP

.....US.....NATO.....USSR.....NSWP

108 PERSHING...108 US PERSHING...NONE.....NONE

-.....72 FRG PERSHING

..NATO TOTAL 180 PERSHING.....WP TOTAL NONE

.....SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

SYSTEM.....RANGE (KM).....NR. IN NGA

FROG 3.....37.....38-41

HONEST JOHN.....40.....118

FROG 7.....70.....163

LANCE.....130.....36

SERGEANT.....140.....21

SCUD A.....148.....18

SCUD B.....295.....162-173

PERSHING.....740.....180

ICOD: END 74

1.THE SOVIETS POSSESS TWO OTHER NUCLEAR SSM SYSTEMS, THE  
SCALEBOARD AND SHADDOCK (AN AIR BREATHING CRUISE MISSILE),  
WITH OVER 500 KM RANGE. AT PRESENT NEITHER IS KNOWN TO BE  
IN EASTERN EUROPE.

2. AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE TABLE, THE PERSHING SYSTEM  
IS IN A CATEGORY SEPARATE FROM THE OTHER SSMS IN THE NGA.  
THE OTHER CATEGORIES ARE ESSENTIALLY FROG/HONEST JOHN AND  
LANCE/SERGEANT/SCUD.

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.....TABLE III

.....MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN THE NGA--TOTAL STOCKS

(1)

...US.....SOVIET.....NATO.....WP

....(2)

2033 M-60... 3920 T-54/55....2033 US.....9185 SOVIET

.....SERIES

.....4785 T-62.....435 CENTURION..1540 T-34

.....250 T-10.....670 CHIEFTAIN..7650 T-54/55

.....230 JS/JSU.....2872 LEOPARD.....10 T-62

.....262 M-47

.....1311 M-48 SERIES

.....260 AMX-30

TOTAL 2033.....TOTAL 9195.....5810 NON-US.....9200 NON-SOV

.....7843 TOTAL.....18,385

.....TOTAL

.....ICOD: END 74

(1) UE AND OE

(2) APPROXIMATELY 700 ADDITIONAL TANKS ARE AUTHORIZED BUT  
NOT CURRENTLY IN AREA. END TEXT. INGERSOLL

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
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**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** TEXT, MILITARY AIRCRAFT, MEETINGS, CONSULTANTS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 15 MAR 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GarlanWA  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
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